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THE CONSTITUTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
MARK TuSHNET* 
I. INTRODUCfION 
Recent interest in civil society appears to have been generated in 
part by concern that individuals acting directly in politics are unable 
to control the growth of their government or the policies it adopts. 
Mass society, it sometimes seems, deprives each of us of the resources 
necessary for responsible participation in our own political 
governance. We find ourselves unable to perform the dual tasks of 
democratic citizens: prodding our government to do what is necessary 
to ensure social well-being, and overseeing our government to ensure 
that it does not degenerate into an institution driven entirely from 
within that follows its own rather than our directives. Invigorating 
the institutions of civil society, it is thought, will serve an important 
democratic function by enhancing our capacity to act as responsible 
citizens.1 Those institutions will allow us simultaneously to stand 
apart from government, resisting and limiting its overreaching, and to 
engage in self-government through truly democratic institutions.2 
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law 
Center. I would like to thank the participants in a Georgetown University Interdisciplinary 
Seminar on Trust and Democracy (1995-96) for helping me develop my ideas about the topic. 
1. This Article does not distinguish between the two widely noted groups interested in 
revitalizing civil society, the relatively more conservative civic moralists and the somewhat more 
liberal communitarians. For discussions of the differences between these groups, see Linda C. 
McClain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society Revivalists, 75 CHI.-KENT L. 
REv. 301 (2000); Jean L. Cohen, Does Voluntary Association Make Democracy Work? The 
Contemporary American Discourse of Civil Society and Its Dilemmas (Nov. 9, 1996) 
(unpublished manuscript in author's possession). 
2. As Cohen and Arato summarize de TocqueviIle's analysis, "without active participation 
on the part of citizens in egalitarian institutions and civil associations, as well as in politically 
relevant organizations, there will be no way to maintain the democratic character of the political 
culture or of social and political institutions." JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL 
SOCIETY AND POLmCAL THEORY 19 (1992); see also Tracy B. Strong, Civil Society, Hard 
Cases, and the End of the Cold War, in TOWARD A GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 69, 71 (Michael 
Walzer ed., 1995) ("It is the resistance to totalization that seems to me the necessary 
precondition for the existence of civil society."). 
379 
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The mechanisms by which participation in civil society's 
institutions produce citizens with the desired characteristics in their 
public participation are not entirely dear.3 Civil society's institutions, 
it is said, allow us to generate and maintain values independent of the 
state's influence.4 In Ernest Gellner's words, 
Civil Society is that set of diverse non-governmental institutions 
which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and, while not 
preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace 
and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent it 
from dominating and atomizing the rest of society ... Civil Society 
can check and oppose the state. It is not supine before it.s 
A paradox lies at the heart of this interest in revitalizing the 
institutions of civil society as a check on government: Those 
institutions are themselves constituted by government, not in the 
sense that they are called into being by government, but in the sense 
that their boundaries are defined by the government.6 In addition, 
the state provides institutional guarantees to ensure that civil society's 
institutions are viable.7 Civil society's institutions must have "legally 
3. Margaret Levi argues that Putnam's well-received work fails to explain how 
participation in civil society's institutions produces such citizens. Margaret Levi, Social and 
Unsocial Capital: A Review Essay of Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work, 24 POL. & 
SOC'y 45, 46-48 (1996). The mechanism must be indirect, in the sense that producing such 
citizens is not the institutions' goal, if the argument is that participation in them has the desired 
effect. See Jean Cohen, Interpreting the Notion of Civil Society, in TOWARD A GLOBAL CIvIL 
SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 35, 38 ("[T)he political role of civil society is not directly related to the 
conquest of power, but to the generation of influence, through the life of democratic 
associations and unconstrained discussion in a variety of cultural and informal public spheres."). 
4. See, e.g., PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: 
FROM STATE TO CIVIL SOCIETY 189-90 (2d ed. 1996). 
5. ERNEST GELLNER, CONDmONS OF LIBERTY: QVIL SOCIETY AND ITS RIvALS 5, 193 
(1994). 
6. See COHEN & ARATO, supra note 2, at 352 (noting that "the private and even the 
intimate 'spheres' have always been constituted and regulated by law, even if what is constituted 
includes a domain of autonomous judgment that can come into conflict with the law"); id. at 7 
("[G)eneral laws and impartial justice are crucial to the process by which the particularistic 
goals and projects of associated individuals within civil society could be informed by, made 
compatible with, and/or generalized into the normative patterns and universal principles of 
modern constitutional democracies."). 
7. For an introduction to the concept of institutional guarantees, see Ulrich K. Preuss, 
Patterns of Constitutional Evolution and Change in Eastern Europe, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
POLICY AND CHANGE IN EUROPE 95,106-10 (Joachim Jens Hesse & Nevil Johnson eds., 1995); 
see also William E. Forbath, Short Circuit: A Critique of Habermas's Understanding of Law, 
Politics, and Economic Life, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 1441, 1447 (1996) ("[S)uch associations seem 
rarely to flourish without some institutional role in the deliberation and bargaining that attend 
law and policy making .... Frequently, forging and sustaining such a role requires affirmative 
state intervention and support, often in the form of legal mandates."). Institutional guarantees 
are the way in which the law assists or protects civil society's institutions as such; otherwise, all it 
does is protect the rights of individuals who happen to have chosen to congregate into 
something we call an institution, but only as a matter of convenience. 
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recognized entitlements."8 
Laws specify what counts as a family, for example.9 Laws define 
the permissible range of activities by religious institutions. Laws 
directly or indirectly promote various forms of political party 
organization. Consider even the classic example of the institution of 
civil society standing apart from government: the coffeehouses where, 
according to Habermas, civil society first took shape.1° Perhaps in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries people could congregate at 
coffeehouses created by individual initiative and operating with no 
government supervision. Today, however, a coffeehouse operator 
would have to go to the government for a license to serve food, would 
be subject to periodic and sometimes unannounced inspections by 
government health officials, and could exist only as long as zoning 
regulations permitted coffeehouses in the location of choice. All 
8. Martin Krygier & Adam Czamota, Rights, Civil Society and Post-Communist Society, in 
WESTERN RIGHTS?: POST-COMMUNIST APPLICATION 101, 118 (Andras Saj6 ed., 1996) 
(emphasis omitted). 
9. I acknowledge the controversy in the literature on civil society over whether the family 
counts as an institution of civil society or whether it is the expression of the individual 
unmediated institutionally. Compare COHEN & ARATO, supra note 2, at ix (asserting that civil 
society is "a sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the 
intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary 
associations), social movements, and forms of public communications") (emphasis added), and 
BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 4, at 159 (identifying four "mediating structures-
neighborhood, family, church, and voluntary associations"), and Kai Neilsen, Reconceptualizing 
Civil Society for Now: Some Somewhat Gramscian Turnings, in TOWARD A GLOBAL CML 
SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 41, 44 ("By civil society ... I mean the public space between large-
scale bureaucratic structures of state and economy on the one hand, and the private sphere of 
family, friendships, personality, and intimacy on the other.") (quoting Walter Adamson), with 
MARVIN B. BECKER, THE EMERGENCE OF CML SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: A 
PRMLEGED MOMENT IN THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, SCOTLAND AND FRANCE 122 (1994) 
(quoting Hegel's assertion that "[clivil society is the stage of difference which intervenes 
between the family and the state"), and Terry Pinkard, Neo-Hegelian Reflections on the 
Communitarian Debate, in TOWARD A GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 113, 122-23 
(relying on Hegel to treat the family as distinct from "the modem market" and "the modem 
constitutional state"). For purposes of this Article, it seems to me unnecessary to engage that 
controversy, and throughout I will treat the family as an institution of civil society. I similarly 
ignore the question of whether civil society's institutions include the market or stand apart from 
both market and the state. For a formulation suggesting that civil society includes the market, 
see id. at 75 (quoting Gellner as asserting that civil society "ensure[sl a safe and autonomous 
productive zone") (emphasis added). For an idiosyncratic definition of civil society, see 
Elizabeth S. Anderson, The Democratic University: The Role of Justice in the Production of 
Knowledge, 12 SOC. POL'y & PHIL. 186,203 (1995) ("Civil society consists of those social spaces 
which are universally accessible to all citizens, and in which citizens ideally interact as equals, on 
terms acceptable to all."). 
10. See JURGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC 
SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 33 (Thomas Burger trans., 
1989); see also BECKER, supra note 9, at 59 (listing "[Platriotic societies, reading clubs, masonic 
lodges, academies of sciences and the fine arts" as "a sample of the numerous manifestations" of 
the new institutions of civil society). 
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these modes of government regulation might be deployed to inhibit 
the growth of coffeehouses as locations where opposition to the 
government might develop. 
Further, the state does, and often must, provide support for civil 
society's institutions. As Michael Walzer points out, 
Families with working parents need state help in the form of 
publicly funded day care and effective public schools .... 
Philanthropy and mutual aid, churches and private universities, 
depend upon tax exemptions. Labor unions need legal recognition 
and guarantees against 'unfair labor practices,' and professional 
associations need state support for their licensing proceduresY 
On a more mundane level, a substantial part of the funding for 
nonprofit institutions, an important subset of the broader category 
with which this Article deals, comes from the government itselfY 
The paradox then is obvious. How can civil society's institutions 
constrain and be a source of appropriate influence on the very 
government that defines the boundaries within which they may 
operate and assists them with institutional guarantees?13 The paradox 
of civil society's constitution by law mixes conceptual and practical 
concerns.14 Of course a society can have vigorous civil-society 
institutions, when the government, or the people acting through their 
government, choose to define broadly the space within which civil-
society institutions can operate unencumbered. On the conceptual 
level, though, the very existence of a government with even 
unexercised power to limit civil-society institutions restricts the ability 
of those institutions themselves to constrain and independently 
influence government.l5 They must, in a sense, always be looking 
11. Michael Walzer, The Concept of Civil Society, in TOWARD A GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY, 
supra note 2, at 7, 23. 
12 See Lester M. Salamon & Helmut K. Anheier, The Civil Society Sector, SOCIETY, Jan.-
Feb. 1997, at 63, 63 (reporting that the nonprofit sector in the United States receives 30% of its 
funding from government, 19% from private donations, and 51 % from fees and dues). 
13. As Hegel put it, "[A]s the stage of difference, [civil society] presupposes the state: to 
subsist itself, it must have the state before its eyes as something self-subsistent." BECKER, supra 
note 9, at 122. 
14. The paradox also helps distinguish those interested in civil society from libertarians. 
The former believe that institutions shape individual preferences and abilities, and can be used 
to discipline the government; they see a constitution's role as structuring civil society's 
institutions to shape preferences and abilities to constrain government. Libertarians see 
individual preferences and abilities as entirely self-generated, and see the role of a constitution 
as restricting government by ensuring that it does not intrude on a sphere of decision-making 
predicated on self-generated values. 
15. This conceptual point is identical in structure to the Legal Realist critique of the idea of 
a market constituted independently of law. For a discussion in the context of discussions of the 
distinctions among the state, the market, and civil society, see Forbath, supra note 7, at 1448-52. 
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over their shoulders. "If we do this," they must always ask, "will the 
government retract the freedom it has given us?" The risk alone will 
operate as a check on civil-society institutions. 
There is a second conceptual point. At least with respect to 
some institutions, political parties being the most notable, the 
government has no choice but to act in ways that encourage some and 
inhibit other civil-society institutions.16 Consider for example the 
choice among electoral systems in which the person with the most 
votes in a district is elected (plurality-based systems), systems in 
which the person with a majority of the votes in the district is elected 
(majority-based systems), and proportional representation systems, in 
which a number of representatives are elected from each district or in 
nation-wide elections. Political scientists have established that the 
district-based systems encourage the development of two political 
parties that actively pursue votes, while proportional representation 
systems (and systems in which representatives are chosen by an 
absolute majority, after a run-off election if necessary) encourage the 
development of many major partiesY A democratic society has to 
have an electoral system, and the choice it makes will produce either 
many parties or only two. The number of parties, in turn, can indicate 
the vigor with which the society'S institutions of civil society operate. 
The problem I identify here occurs only when the government 
must choose a course of action that has implications for civil-society 
institutions. In some areas, nothing compels a choice. So, for 
example, governments could refrain from defining what constitutes a 
valid marriage, even if it conferred benefits or imposed burdens on 
people in marriages. It would then let anyone who claimed to be in a 
marriage obtain its legal benefits and bear its legal burdens. The fact 
that the example is extreme shows that in the real world governments 
will actually do a great deal to define the boundaries of civil society's 
institutions. . , 
We might reduce the scope of the paradox created by the fact 
that the government defines the boundaries of civil society's 
institutions by imposing limits on permissible definitions. Imposing 
limits on government actions is, after all, what constitutions do. So, in 
a phrase, the Constitution might limit the way in which the 
16. Political parties are ambiguously civil-society institutions because they are so closely 
bound up with the state's operation. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 38 (including parties as part of 
"political" rather than civil society because they "are directly involved with state power"). 
17. For a summary, see VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK V. TuSHNET, COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUIONAL LAW 713-14 (1999). . 
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government constitutes civil society. IS Governments might be barred 
from defining families as institutions one essential element of which is 
the existence in families at some point in the family's life-course of 
adults of different sexes who have the biological capacity to engage in 
procreative sex, for example.19 Or they might be barred from 
enforcing their zoning ordinances against groups that wish to conduct 
congregate religious services in a group-member's home. 
Constitutional limits on governmental power to define the boundaries 
of civil society's institutions might then ensure a vigorous civil society 
sector with the capacity to accomplish what the proponents of the 
revitalization of those institutions desire. 
The next Sections of this Article survey contemporary U.S. 
constitutional law about some of civil society's institutions. I 
demonstrate that, whatever the theoretical possibilities might be, the 
actual constitutional law of the contemporary United States does 
little to ensure the vitality of those institutions. Under contemporary 
constitutional doctrine, the government has a great deal of power to 
regulate them. It is not simply conceptually, but practically, that they 
always have to look over their shoulders to see if the government is 
about to come down on them for actions of which the government 
disapproves. 
Of course, there is an obvious response to the skepticism I hope 
to generate by this survey: To the extent that contemporary U.S. 
constitutional doctrine fails to protect the institutions of civil society, 
it is wrong. So, for example, the law of free exercise of religion, as of 
2000, allows governments to regulate religious practices by means of 
neutral laws of general applicability.20 Even if the government may 
do little to define religion as such, current doctrine gives government 
a great deal of power to define the boundaries within which religions 
may permissibly act. But this doctrine has been vigorously criticized, 
from inside and outside the Supreme Court.21 It might be changed by 
18. The final Section of this Article briefly addresses the next level of paradox, that those 
who hope that the Constitution will constrain the government must somehow explain how 
relying on government institutions-whether the judiciary, as we ordinarily think, or any other 
government enforcer of constitutional constraints-to limit the government's power to define 
the boundaries of civil society'S institution escapes, rather than recreates, the paradox that the 
Article's central Sections describe. 
19. I am not confident that the existence-condition in the text accurately captures what is 
on the side that opposes same-sex marriage in the contemporary debate, but I am confident that 
the definition, if inaccurate, could be modified without losing my basic point. 
20. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). 
21. For a scholar's critique, see Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the 
Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109 (1990). For criticism from Supreme Court justices, see 
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the Court itself. And, more important, the existence of constitutional 
doctrine that offers little comfort to civil society's institutions does 
not mean that the Constitution properly understood offers similarly 
scant comfort. 
I agree with this response, when it is taken in the right way. For 
me, it is not that we can hope for the modification of the doctrines 
that provide little protection to civil society, but that we can hope to 
work toward a better social understanding of what the Constitution 
truly means. The Constitution's true meaning is, in my view, simply 
independent of what the Supreme Court says about the Constitution. 
The Court may sometimes get the Constitution right, but the mere 
fact that the Court has interpreted the Constitution to mean one thing 
rather than another has no necessary relation to the Constitution's 
meaning. 
In saying this, however, I may create another paradox. I believe 
that we can try to work toward a better understanding of the 
Constitution. But, if those who believe that contemporary 
institutions of civil society are debilitated are correct, through what 
institutions can we do so? That is, my hope must be implemented by 
the very institutions that, according to those concerned about civil 
society, lack the capacity to generate a democratic citizenry of the 
sort that could work toward a better understanding of the 
Constitution. The circle is thus closed. 
Once again, I agree. The implication I draw, however, is that 
those concerned about the weakness of civil society's institutions are 
wrong. I believe that nothing other than lack of will and leadership 
bars us from developing a democratic citizenry capable of supporting 
a powerful yet constrained government. The problem, if there is one, 
is not institutional but political. The government may constitute civil 
society, but the Constitution properly understood constitutes the 
government, and a government properly constituted would allow the 
institutions of civil society to flourish. 
The preceding paragraphs have been highly theoretical. The 
remainder of this Article works much closer to the ground. It 
sketches how the free expression, freedom of religion, and 
substantive due process provisions of the U.S. Constitution have been 
interpreted to define and protect families, religious institutions, non-
the opinions of Justices O'Connor, Breyer, and Souter in Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), 
all of which urge the Court to reconsider Employment Division v. Smith. 
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political associations, and political parties.22 I have organized the 
discussion by topics rather than by institutions.23 The next section 
examines the ways in which constitutional law defines civil society's 
institutions, and Section III examines the extent to which it allows 
government to regulate them. Section IV deals with the constitutional 
restrictions on government's power to give unconditional or 
conditional grants to civil society's institutions. The Conclusion 
returns to the themes of this Section, but provides some greater detail 
on the ways in which government's constitutional power to define and 
regulate civil society's institutions, while substantial, might 
nonetheless be limited, not so much by the Constitution, but, again 
paradoxically, by civil society itself. 
II. DEFINING CIVIL SOCIETY'S INSTITUTIONS 
We can think of the Constitution as dividing government's power 
over civil society into two zones. In the first, government has the 
power to act, although it need not do so, whereas in the second the 
government may not act. So, for example, some cases uphold 
government definitions of family against constitutional challenge, 
without holding that the government must define families as it has. 
Other cases, in contrast, find it unconstitutional for government to 
define family in a particular way. This Section aims at sketching 
answers to two questions. First, how large is the zone of permissible 
government action relative to the zone of impermissible action? The 
answer to this question will help us assess the degree to which the 
Constitution ensures a large enough domain for civil society'S 
institutions to serve as effective checks on government power and 
sources of independent influence on it. Second, what principles seem 
to determine where the line between permissible and impermissible 
action is drawn? The answer to this question may suggest some of the 
possibilities and limits on the ability of civil society's institutions to 
serve as effective checks and sources of influence. 
The Supreme Court has defined family for constitutional 
22. I use the word sketch advisedly. I attempt to capture the mainstream of contemporary 
constitutional law, acknowledging that good lawyers might develop arguments showing that 
existing constitutional doctrinal already does-or can be changed modestly so that it would-
protect civil society'S institutions more effectively than my description suggests. 
23. Although my primary focus is on U.S. constitutional law, I occasionally mention the 
treatment of civil society'S institutions in other constitutional systems to indicate that nothing 
inherent in the concept of liberal constitutionalism dictates the particular U.S. resolution of the 
questions at issue in this Article. 
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purposes in a handful of cases, applying the Equal Protection and 
Due Process Clauses.24 Consider first the cases allowing government 
to deny family status to certain living arrangements. Village of Belle 
Terre v. Boraas found no violation of equal protection principles in a 
town's zoning ordinance that refused to allow a group of unrelated 
students to live in an area zoned for single-"family" . houses while 
allowing an equally large number of people related biologically or by 
adoption and other devices of family blending to live in such houses.25 
The Court argued that the town could rationally distinguish between 
the two groups of people because groups of unrelated people might 
reasonably be thought to produce more traffic and noise.26 The town, 
according to Justice William O. Douglas, could "layout zones where 
family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and 
clean air make the area a sanctuary."27 
Michael H. v. Gerald D. upheld a California statute denying a 
child's biological father the opportunity for a hearing when he sought 
to establish that the child was his, because, under the statute, a child 
born while two married people were cohabiting was presumed to be 
the husband's child, a presumption that could rebutted only under 
circumstances not present in the case.28 The case arose out of a 
complex set of personal relationships, which some would describe as a 
non-standard family: the child's biological mother had an affair with 
the biological father while married, and continued to maintain contact 
with him for several years after the child's birth, including sporadic 
sexual and domestic relations, even while she remained married to 
her husband, and had sporadic sexual and domestic relations with him 
as well. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court disparaged these living 
arrangements, suggesting without holding that it would be ridiculous 
for any state to treat these people as members of a single complex 
family.29 
Belle Terre, with its reliance on "family values," and Michael H., 
with its concern about the peculiar structure of human relationships 
in the case, suggest that constitutional law allows governments to 
exclude from the category family relationships that fail to satisfy 
24. For a relatively early but still important discussion, see Robert Burt, The Constitution 
of the Family, 1979 SUP. Cr. REv. 329. 
25. 416 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1974). 
26. See id. at 9. 
27. Id. 
28. 491 U.S. 110, 131-32 (1989). 
29. See id. at 113 ("The facts of this case are, we must hope, extraordinary."). 
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traditionalist standards. Traditionalism, that is, is the principle 
determining the location of the line between permissible and 
impermissible definitions of family. If so, constitutional law is an 
unpromising location for identifying the ways in which civil society's 
institutions might help us limit government's powers, because 
traditionalism itself will both limit government power (to what 
government has traditionally done), and provide the basis for some 
intrusions on private life that proponents of civil society might find 
troubling. 
Cases limiting government power support the suggestion that 
traditionalism sets the limit on government's power to define family. 
For example, in denying Wisconsin the power to require that older 
adolescent children be sent to school because the requirement 
violated the Free Exercise Clause,3o the Court pointedly observed that 
the religious group offering the objection, the Old Order Amish, 
adhered to traditional values with respect to child-rearing and social 
productivity,31 contrasting the group with recently created groups that 
held merely philosophical beliefs opposing public education.32 
The only case directly rejecting a locality's restrictive definition 
of family has the same structure. The City of East Cleveland adopted 
a zoning ordinance that had the effect of making it impossible for a 
grandmother to live in the same household with the children of her 
two daughters.33 Most observers believe that this effect was 
inadvertent,34 but the city defended its ordinance on the ground that it 
was entitled to exclude extended families like the Moores from its 
legal definition of family. The Supreme Court disagreed, in a 
fractured opinion. Justice Lewis F. Powell's plurality opinion restated 
the traditionalist theme: the Moore family was not nuclear in the most 
restrictive sense, but it obviously was a representative example 'of a 
30. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972). 
31. See id. at 212-13 (asserting that "[t]he evidence ... showed that the Amish have an 
excellent record as law-abiding and generally self-sufficient members of society"); see also id. at 
222 (asserting that the "members [of the Amish community] are productive and very law-
abiding members of society; they reject public welfare in any of its usual modem forms"). 
32 See id. at 235 ("[W)e are not dealing with a way of life and mode of education by a 
group claiming to have recently discovered some 'progressive' or more enlightened process for 
rearing children for modem life."). 
33. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 496 (1977). 
34. Chief Justice Burger's dissent, resting on the legally peculiar ground that Moore should 
have sought a variance before challenging the ordinance's constitutionality, is probably best 
understood as predicated on the assumption that the city really did not intend the effect its 
ordinance had. See id. at 521 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (referring to the case as one "which 
could have been disposed of long ago at the local level"). 
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long-standing practice of child-rearing in extended families. 
According to Justice Powell, the city could not constitutionally adopt 
the most restrictive definition of nuclear families; instead, the 
Constitution required it to treat the living arrangements adopted by 
the Moores as a family. 
So far it would seem that the Constitution places only a 
traditionalist limit on government's ability to define family. If so, one 
would expect the families that the government recognizes to 
reproduce rather than to limit traditionalist practices by government. 
There is, however, one important exception to this picture. 
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno found unconstitutional a federal 
statute denying federal food stamp benefits to unrelated people living 
together in what were understood to be "hippie communes" even 
though people living in families with the same number of members 
received the food stamps.35 According to the Court, the statute was 
motivated by simple dislike for a class of people, and simple dislike 
could never provide a constitutionally acceptable reason for denying 
a governmental benefit. 
Moreno could readily be dismissed as an aberration, but for the 
fact that it played a significant role in the Court's far more important 
decision in Romer v. Evans.36 There, a solid majority of the Court 
found unconstitutional a Colorado constitutional amendment that, as 
the Court interpreted it, denied gays and lesbians the opportunity to 
claim the ordinary protections of law available to every other citizen.37 
The Court invoked Moreno in finding the amendment 
unconstitutional because it was motivated by sheer dislike of gays and 
lesbians.38 
Taken together with the Court's privacy jurisprudence, Romer 
seems to provide a reasonably firm foundation for arguments that 
states may not refuse to treat same-sex couples as families.39 As 
Professor Cass Sunstein suggested before Romer was decided, one 
might attribute the tradition-oriented decisions to the fact that the 
35. 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) ("If the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the 
laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare ... desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."). 
36. 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996). 
37. It is well-known, of course, that this characterization of the amendment may be 
inaccurate, and indeed the Court's opinion is quite obscure on whether, or on the extent to 
which, its opinion rests importantly on this characterization. 
38. 517 U.S. at 634-35. 
39. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: 
FROM SEXUAL LmERTY TO aVILIZED COMMITMENT (1996). 
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constitutional provision invoked was the Due Process Clause, and 
explain tradition-rejecting decisions on the ground that the Equal 
Protection Clause's function is to ensure that legislatures not enforce 
traditionalism so as to discriminate as social change occurs.40 
It would go beyond the bounds I have set for this Article to 
develop in detail the arguments and counterarguments on this 
question. Instead, we should think about the claims regarding same-
sex marriage in the context of the larger issue of the role of civil 
society's institutions in disciplining government. The Supreme 
Court's modern privacy jurisprudence began with Griswold v. 
Connecticut.41 Justice John Marshall Harlan concurred in the 
majority's decision finding unconstitutional a statute that made it an 
offense for a married couple to use contraceptives. In explaining his 
position, Justice Harlan made it clear that the due process principles 
on which he relied, which were oriented toward making it 
impermissible for states to ban practices widely protected by the 
values of a traditionalist society, did not imply that states could not 
ban homosexual conduct.42 Thirty years ago, that is, the claim that the 
Constitution required states to recognize same-sex marriages was so 
far off-the-wall as to be almost inconceivable. 
Romer enhances the credibility of the legal case for same-sex 
marriage. What was unthinkable a short time ago has become not 
merely thinkable, but actually rather plausible. And yet few would 
confidently predict that the Supreme Court will follow the logic of the 
arguments for same-sex marriage in the next few years. 
The question to ask in the context of this Article is: What 
produced this combination of legal possibility and legal unlikelihood? 
And the answer is obvious: the gay rights movement, and the 
backlash against it. Here we see a concrete manifestation of the 
paradox of using civil society's institutions to discipline government. 
40. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the 
Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CIn. L. REv. 1161, 1163-64 
(1988). 
41. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
42 See id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring). This opinion incorporates by reference Justice 
Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, in which he stated, "I would not suggest that 
adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest are inImune from crinIinal enquiry, however 
privately practiced." 367 U.S. 497,552 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 1 should note, however, 
that Justice Harlan's opinion in Griswold does not cite this page of his Poe dissent. Justice 
Arthur Goldberg'S concurring opinion in Griswold does cite the sentences that follow the one 1 
have quoted, whose content indicates that Justice Goldberg would not have upheld a clainI that 
homosexual conduct was constitutionally protected. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499 (Goldberg, 
J., concurring). 
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Those institutions, taking the form of the gay rights movement, did 
indeed open up the possibility of a form of discipline: Perhaps 
government cannot define family to exclude same-sex relationships. 
But those institutions, taking the form of the backlash, also limit that 
possibility. And, of course, the one civil-society institution that 
cannot serve to discipline the government in its definition of family is 
the family itself, because that is the object of the controversy.43 
Romer opens up some space for insisting that government's 
definitions of family cannot be entirely traditionalist, and thereby 
opens up some space for the constitutionally-protected family to be a 
source, independent of tradition, on government power. But, I 
believe, that space is rather small. Belle Terre, Michael H., and even 
Moore are, in my view, far more representative, and suggest that the 
domain of the constitutionally protected family is not large enough to 
support robust civil-society institutions to discipline government.44 
III. REGULATING CIVIL SOCIETY'S INSTITUTIONS 
Describing contemporary constitutional doctrine about the 
government's power to regulate civil society's institutions requires 
that we draw a large number of distinctions. A catalogue with 
illustrative examples may be a helpful introduction to the descriptive 
survey. 
(1) Government may seek to regulate an institution's external 
acts, that is, what it does in the public domain. A state may seek to 
prohibit or regulate a religious institution's practices, directing that it 
preserve its original building's facade in the course of a renovation 
because the facade is part of a historic preservation district. It may 
bar the religion's adherents from engaging in ritual slaughter or 
consumption of illegal drugs. 
(2) Government may seek to regulate an institution's internal 
43. Religion, or more properly religions, are the other institutions of civil society where 
defmition can be important. Many non-U.S. legal systems have processes for registering 
religious organizations, and for distinguishing among types of such organizations. For an 
overview of some of these systems, see JACKSON & TuSHNET, supra note 17, at 1155-56 
(describing the Greek system), 1245-46 (describing the Russian system). U.S. constitutional law 
has been more reluctant to define institutions as religious or not. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET 
AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1543-46 (3d ed. 1996) (describing U.S. cases and commentary). 
Instead, where non-traditional religions and their practices are involved, the courts typically 
assume that the organizations are religious and then find constitutionally permissible the 
regulations in question. For a discussion of the standards applied in such cases, see infra Section 
III. 
44. Again, beyond the discipline imposed by tradition itself. 
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operation, that is, how it acts within areas where it generally has 
competence. A state may seek to invoke general anti-discrimination 
norms to bar a religious institution from refusing to employ non-
members in some jobs. Here the government seeks to regulate 
internal acts on general normative grounds, unrelated to the fact that 
the regulated institution, as part of civil society, plays an important 
part in a well-ordered society. Alternatively, the government may 
seek to regulate internal acts on the ground that the regulation, 
though limiting civil society's institutions in certain ways, nonetheless 
increases the overall ability of those institutions to control and 
influence government. It may object to child-rearing practices 
derived from religious belief, even going so far as to characterize 
them as child abuse, and defend its regulation on the ground that 
children raised in other ways will be better able as adults to 
participate in civil society and government. 
(3) The government may seek to regulate institutions that 
engage in expressive activity because the government is concerned 
about activity conducted through the institution. Here it might claim 
that the association's actions threatened social stability, or that its 
decisions constituted an impermissible form of discrimination. 
Alternatively, the government may seek to regulate these institutions 
because their existence and non-expressive activities convey a 
message about which the government is concerned. Institutions that 
discriminate in their choice of members may not engage in any other 
questionable activities, but the very fact that they discriminate there 
may subject them to government's regulatory efforts. 
Plainly, each of these regulatory efforts raises a host of 
constitutional questions, under several constitutional provisions. I 
argue in this Section that an observer (not an advocate) examining 
contemporary constitutional doctrine should conclude that the 
doctrine gives civil society'S institutions some protection against 
intrusive regulation, but not all that much. I offer an extremely brief, 
though I believe accurate, survey of contemporary constitutional 
doctrine dealing with the regulation of families, churches, civic 
associations, and political parties under the Due Process Clause and 
the First Amendment. My conclusion is simple: To remain free of 
regulation, civil society's institutions must remain in government's 
good graces. On the whole, they must rely on government's 
willingness to refrain from regulating rather than being assured by 
constitutional law that government cannot regulate them. 
Contemporary constitutional doctrine thus does not provide 
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protection sufficient to ensure a robust civil society. 
A. Regulating External Acts 
We can begin with the most general statement of government's 
regulatory power. As a general matter, no civil-society institution can 
resist a government regulation that is, as the Court has put it, a 
neutral regulation of general applicability. The case articulating this 
rule most clearly is the notorious Employment Division v. Smith.45 As 
interpreted by the state supreme court, Oregon's unemployment 
compensation law denied unemployment benefits to workers who 
were fired for violating the state's prohibition on the use of certain 
drugs, including peyote. Smith used peyote as part of the religious 
observances of the Native American Church, of which he was a 
member.46 He argued that the state's ban on peyote use was 
unconstitutional when applied to people who used the drug in 
religious ceremonies. The Supreme Court disagreed. According to 
the Court, the state was not required to provide an exemption from 
its neutral laws of general applicability for those who violated those 
laws as part of a religious practice. 
Neutrality means that the regulation was not adopted with the 
purpose of suppressing a religious (or expressive) activity.47 And 
general applicability means that the regulation has sufficiently broad 
scope to encompass a reasonable number of activities unquestionably 
subject to regulation because the activities implicate no values of 
constitutional dimension.48 
The Court's modem statement of this rule generated enormous 
controversy, but at its core lies an entirely sensible observation. The 
mere fact that an institution is religious-or, more generally, is a civil-
45. 494 U.S. 872, 878-80, 890 (1990). The Court applied this doctrine to expressive activity 
in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
46. For a description of the factual background of the case, see Garrett Epps, To an 
Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Division v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953 
(1998). 
47. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993). I 
have assumed in the parenthetical in the text that the Court would apply this definition, 
developed with respect to regulation of religion, to regulation of expression, just as it has 
applied the broad rule about statutes of general applicability to both religious and expressive 
activities. 
48. A regulation is generally applicable, that is, when it is not gerrymandered so that, 
though written in neutral terms, its domain of application is restricted to religious or expressive 
activities. For an application of the anti-gerrymandering norm, see Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 
228,251-55 (1982). 
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society institution-tells us little about the social harm it may cause.49 
Consider, as a relatively uncontroversial example, the application of 
antitrust laws to media conglomerates.5o It is indeed difficult to see 
why the fact that a corporate entity produces information rather than 
steel should matter when the harm to consumers caused by 
newspapers' antitrust violations is indistinguishable from the harm to 
them caused by steel makers' antitrust violations. Similarly, I am 
hard-pressed to see why a newspaper reporter should be exempt from 
the application of ordinary laws making house-breaking a crime 
simply because the reporter broke into the house to obtain 
information about the misconduct of public officials that readers and 
voters would find valuable. Experience elsewhere shows that the 
problems are no different when religions are involved. The Japanese 
experience with a religious organization that released a dangerous 
chemical in the Tokyo subway system should be enough to establish 
that the Court's willingness to allow states to apply neutral rules of 
general applicability to religious institutions' external activities has a 
sensible core. 
Perhaps the cost-benefit calculation should differ when civil 
society's institutions rather than market institutions are involved, 
however. Surely in a particular case the social harm of house-
breaking can be outweighed by the social benefit flowing from the 
information disclosure. The idea would be that most activities of civil 
society's institutions lie outside the core where the Court's approach 
makes sense. Instead of applying the general rule to all their 
activities, the state should be allowed to regulate civil society's 
institutions only by showing, rather than assuming, that the activities 
cause social harmY But, at least in this area, the Court has proceeded 
49. I believe that some of the controversy over the Court's invocation of its approach in the 
religious context is that many people do not really believe that the activities the government 
seeks to regulate cause substantial social harm. So, for example, many think that consumption 
of peyote is an entirely self-regarding activity, a victimless crime; that there is rarely a strong 
reason for performing an autopsy on someone who died while a passenger in an automobile 
accident; and that the precise details of historic preservation practices could be varied without 
real loss to any particular historic preservation district. I share many of these views, but they 
are, at bottom, challenges to the government's general authority to adopt these regulations, and 
are best understood as general due process challenges or, in more traditional terms, arguments 
that the regulations lie outside the government's police powers. 
50. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1,7 (1945). 
51. In the jargon, the state would be allowed to regulate on showing that doing so served a 
compelling state interest. Presumably one could deal with examples like the Japanese subway 
problem by finding that state regulation did so. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Smith 
correctly observed that the Court's decisions strongly suggested that the Court actually applied 
a watered-down "compelling state interest" test in religion cases. Employment Div. v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872, 885-86 (1990). 
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on the assumption that government may use a rule-based system 
rather than a case-specific one (although, presumably, the 
government could always make case-specific, cost-benefit 
calculations). The state may adopt rules that satisfy the required cost-
benefit calculation: A rule is constitutionally permissible when the 
benefits from applying the rule to the entire range of cases to which it 
applies exceed the costs of doing so. 
The next question is then: Does the Constitution require that 
states adopt rules that have a restricted range? That is, assume that 
some particular neutral rule of general applicability does in fact 
satisfy the cost-benefit test. Nonetheless, there may be discrete 
subcategories within its applicable range where the rule does not pass 
the cost-benefit test. Does the Constitution require that states tailor 
their rules to exclude such subcategories from an otherwise 
permissible neutral rule of general applicability? The Court's answer 
has been no, largely for administrative reasons. As the Court has 
seen the problem, forcing the government to design rules so precisely 
would place too heavy a burden on government.52 
B. Regulating Internal Acts 
Taken most broadly, the Court's approach would license a 
tremendous amount of apparently intrusive regulation of civil 
society'S institutions, to the point where they could hardly serve as 
constraints and independent sources of influence on government at 
all. The classic example is the application of gender and sexual 
orientation anti-discrimination norms to religious institutions. 
Perhaps such institutions could act as true civil-society institutions if 
they were barred from discrimination against women or gays and 
lesbians in their non-religious activities, for example, in the 
employment of maintenance workers for their churches.53 But it 
would severely undermine their ability to do so if they were unable to 
52. This may be one defense of the otherwise peculiar exception to the "neutral rules" 
holding in Employment Division v. Smith. See id. at 878-80, 890. Under that exception, a state 
may be required to exempt religious objectors when it has in place a system for making other 
individual exceptions to the general rule. Perhaps this can be justified on the ground that by 
creating the mechanism for individualized determinations, the state itself has demonstrated a 
willingness to perform case-specific, cost -benefit calculations. 
53. The Court, however, has expressed sympathy with the congressional judgment that it 
would be overly intrusive for a government agency to determine that some facet of a church's 
operation was peripheral to its religious mission. See Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327, 329-30, 336 (1987). The Bishop decision upheld a congressional decision to defer 
to church choices, and does not indicate what the Court would have done had Congress chosen 
to be more intrusive. See id. at 339. 
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enforce religiously determined discriminatory choices at the core of 
their activities, as in the selection of ministers. 
I believe the intuition is so widespread that the Constitution 
should preclude a government from invoking its nondiscrimination 
norms against core practices of civil-society institutions.54 The route 
to defending that intuition is reasonably clear: the distinction, 
suggested at the outset, between regulation of external and internal 
activities. Yet, even if we invoke that distinction, room remains for a 
substantial amount of government regulation of internal activities. 
We can begin by noting that, for many, civil society's institutions 
are instrumentally valuable. They believe government should refrain 
from regulating those institutions because the institutions help create 
a well-governed society. One might then note, however, that not all 
civil-society institutions are instrumentally valuable in that way. 
Their internal activities may produce people who are unable to 
function well as citizens in a democratic society. 
In the Yoder case, discussed earlier, Wisconsin urged the Court 
to allow it to require high-school education for adolescents because 
enough Amish children were likely to leave their communities to 
make it a matter of social concern that they be able to participate as 
effective citizens.55 The Court rejected the state's argument, but only 
because, as the Court saw it, the state had not established the factual 
predicate on which it relied.56 According to the Court, the Amish 
educated their children well enough so that even those who left the 
community could participate in the wider society.57 
As a matter of principle, state regulation of the internal activities 
of civil society's institutions might be justified on civil society 
grounds: Regulation would be allowed when it maximized the 
instrumental effectiveness of those institutions.58 The state might 
seek to prohibit practices that so demoralize some community 
members that they are disabled from acting as responsible citizens. I 
have in mind abusive child-rearing practices, for example, and some 
forms of discriminatory treatment of women who find themselves 
more or less confined to particular civil-society institutions. 
54. That intuition is widely held, although I should note that nothing in the Court's 
decisions strongly suggests that the Constitution does so. 
55. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,224 (1972). 
56. See id. at 224-25. 
57. See id. at 225. 
58. Or, perhaps more narrowly, when it offset some institutional practice that reduced the 
institution's instrumental effectiveness. 
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The Supreme Court has not addressed these issues directly. It 
seems worth pointing out, however, that it would not have to do so if 
it rejected the posited distinction between regulation of external 
activities and regulation of internal activities. Further, the idea that 
legal doctrine could stably distinguish among internal activities that 
reduce civil society's effectiveness and those that promote it seems 
strained. Consider, for example, the argument that discrimination 
against women with respect to occupying positions of religious 
authority might reduce the ability of women to act as effective 
citizens. One need not find this argument compelling to acknowledge 
that some legislatures might at some point reasonably accept it. And, 
if they do, the only reason the Court might give for rejecting it would 
be that legislatures have to respect the internal operation of civil 
society's institutions in toto and cannot respect some while regulating 
others. Yet, as we have seen, that is precisely the argument rejected 
in the peyote case. I conclude, then, that it is unlikely that 
constitutional doctrine would allow regulation of external activities 
under the Smith rule but bar regulation of internal activities in the 
face of a legislative determination that regulation is desirable. Once 
again, civil society's institutions are likely to be more dependent on 
legislative grace than protected by constitutional law. 
C. Regulating Expressive "Acts" 
One line of cases provides some modest collateral support for the 
argument I have made about regulation of internal activities for civil-
society related reasons, and expands our view to incorporate 
regulation of expressive activities. These are the cases allowing 
governments to enforce their anti-discrimination statutes against 
some private associations. For example, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees 
found no constitutional violation in the application of a state's anti-
discrimination statute to the membership policies of a private 
association that, as the Court understood it, played a significant role 
in providing members with commercial and other opportunities.59 
59. 468 u.s. 609, 612, 626 (1984). The Court subsequently invoked Roberts to reject 
constitutional challenges in Board of Director of Rotary International v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 
537,544-49 (1987), and New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 12 (1988). 
These cases explored the limits of the category of private associations that the state might 
properly regulate. Conceding that some associations are so intimate that regulation would be 
unconstitutional, the Court in New York State Club upheld a statute banning discrimination by 
any association with more than 400 members, providing regular meal service, and regularly 
receiving payment from nonmembers. 
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One reason sometimes asserted for applying these statutes to such 
associations is civil-society related: Their existence and practices 
disempower women and others not entitled to membership, not by 
denying them concrete business opportunities, but by reinforcing 
social understandings that women are not full members of the public 
sphere.60 
Seen in this way, Roberts might be thought to raise substantial 
freedom-of-expression problems. Suppose the association adopted its 
discriminatory policies precisely because its members believed, and 
sought to communicate, that women should indeed not be full 
members of the public sphere. Banning discriminatory practices 
would then seem hard to distinguish from banning a speaker because 
the state disagreed with the message the speaker sought to convey, a 
core violation of the First Amendment. And so indeed the Court 
held, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group.61 
There the state supreme court held that the group organizing 
Boston's St. Patrick's Day parade provided, in the parade, a place of 
public accommodation, and that the organizers had to allow 
representatives of gays and lesbians to participate in the parade under 
their own banner because state law prohibited discrimination against 
gays and lesbians in places of public accommodation. Justice David 
Souter, writing for the Court, emphasized the expressive purposes of 
parades. Requiring the parade organizers to allow people with whom 
they disagreed to march would "alter the expressive content" of the 
parade.62 Justice Souter's opinion cited Roberts for a quite general 
proposition, but did not expressly distinguish it. Yet the opinion 
makes the distinction clear. Parades of the sort involved in Hurley 
have few purposes, if any, other than expression, sometimes diffuse 
expression-communicating a general feeling of community 
definition - but expression nonetheless. The First Amendment 
interest must prevail over the non-constitutional interest in 
eliminating discrimination where activities that are nearly exclusively 
expressive are involved.63 The Jaycees and other civic associations, in 
60. For a critique of a broad interpretation of Roberts along these lines, see NANCY 
ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM IN AMERICA 
(1998). Rosenblum argues that regulation of decisions to exclude from membership may be 
justified when they reinforce a status of second-class citizenship. Id. at 167. Roberts may fairly 
be read to adopt such a rationale. For a critique of Rosenblum's argument, see Stuart White, 
Equal Opportunity and the Right to Exclude, in THE GOOD SOCIETY 1, 54 (1999). 
61. 515 U.S. 557, 572-73 (1995). 
62 Id. 
63. The opirrion in Hurley pointed out that those seeking access to the parade did not press 
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contrast to the organizers of the St. Patrick's Day parade, could not 
plausibly claim that all they did was communicate a message about 
women's proper place even though they could claim that their 
membership policies did at least that. 
The point of this analysis is to establish how small the domain of 
protection against regulation is. After all, as political theorist Nancy 
Rosenblum points out, associations like the Jaycees may not do much 
in the way of expression, but their members might, and what their 
members say might be influenced to some degree by the associations 
they acquire through membership in the Jaycees.64 Yet the Court's 
constitutional analysis appears to be unresponsive to these indirect 
expressive effects of civil-society institutions. In contemporary 
constitutional doctrine, only those civil-society institutions whose 
exclusive (or nearly exclusive) purpose is to express some view may 
claim exemption from regulations instrumental to the goal of 
maximizing the effectiveness of civil society. Also, importantly, the 
standard argument for the instrumental value of civil-society 
institutions is that such institutions, though created for purposes other 
than controlling government, have the valuable indirect effect of 
shaping citizens with the capacity to control it.65 Yet contemporary 
constitutional doctrine appears to permit substantial regulation of 
exactly such institutions. 
Something similar might be said about other civil-society 
institutions. Consider colleges and universities, for example. In spite 
of a large literature urging that such institutions should have a 
constitutionally protected domain of academic freedom,66 the 
Supreme Court has never endorsed that claim.67 In other settings, 
institutional interests may simply be derivative of individual ones, so 
an equal protection claim. Id. at 566. 
64. ROSENBLUM, supra note 60, at 194-211. 
65. Such indirect effects played a large role in civil society'S emergence: People did not go 
to coffeehouses merely to discuss politics, but the experience of going to coffeehouses changed 
the way people understood their relation to the state. 
66. It is worth noting, of course, that public colleges and universities are not obvious 
candidates for inclusion in the sphere of civil society anyway, and working out a theory of 
academic freedom for them is particularly difficult. 
67. The most eloquent support for the claim is provided by Justice Felix Frankfurter's 
concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,261-63 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring in the result). Justice Lewis F. Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1978), treated academic freedom "as a special 
concern of the First Amendment," id. at 312, but did not defer to the university's judgment that 
its affirmative action program was necessary to accomplishing the academic goals it sought. I 
find it hard to see a constitutionally protected interest in academic freedom at work in Justice 
Powell's opinion. 
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that the fact that individuals have come together in civil-society 
institutions has no bearing on the constitutional analysis. In such 
settings, the institutions are protected not because they are civil-
society institutions but because the Constitution protects individuals' 
rights. 
Political parties provide my final example of (ambiguously) civil-
society institutions. Their activities substantially affect the way in 
which the government is organized. Giving the government extensive 
power to regulate political parties would obviously have a substantial 
self-reinforcing effect: Governments would regulate parties in ways 
that ensured that parties would do little to change the way 
government operated. Yet this is close to what the law of political 
party regulation is. 
The Court has provided parties some protection against 
regulation. Political parties are associations of like-minded people, 
and their very existence, the Court has said, "presupposes the 
freedom to identify the people who constitute the association."68 
Some internal party arrangements are thus free from state 
regulation.69 The Court has held that a state may not require that 
parties conduct primary elections in which only registered members 
of the party can vote.70 Also, the Court has invalidated a statute 
barring political parties from endorsing or opposing candidates in 
primary elections.71 In doing so, the Court specifically rejected the 
state's argument that the regulation maximized civil-society interests 
by ensuring that a party not pursue a self-destructive course.72 
But these protections are modest indeed. The Court's most 
recent formulation describes a two-stage balancing process: 
When deciding whether a state election law violates First and 
Fourteenth Amendment associational rights, we weigh the 
68. Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981). 
Democratic Party held unconstitutional the state's requirement that delegates to a national 
party convention cast their votes in accordance with the results of the state's "open" primary 
election, in which nonmembers of the party could vote, when that requirement conflicted with 
the national party's rules. 
69. In addition, a series of decisions limits the states' power to exclude third parties from 
the general election ballot. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 805-06 (1983). 
70. See Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 201-11 (1986) (involving a statute 
barring independent voters from participating in a party's primary). Cool Moose Party v. Rhode 
Island, 183 F.3d 80, 88 (1st Cir. 1999), extends the Tashjian holding to prohibit statutes from 
denying parties the opportunity of voting in their primary to voters registered in other parties. 
71. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Corom., 489 U.S. 214, 216 (1989). 
72 See id. at 227-28 ("[EJven if a ban on endorsements saves a political party from 
pursuing self-destructive acts, that would not justify a State substituting its judgment for that of 
the party."). 
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character and magnitude of the burden the State's rule imposes on 
those rights against the interests the State contends justify that 
burden, and consider the extent to which the State's concerns make 
the burden necessary. Regulations imposing severe burdens on 
plaintiffs' rights must be narrowly tailored and advance a 
compelling state interest. Lesser burdens, however, trigger less 
exacting review, and a State's important regulatory interests will 
usually be enough to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory 
restrictions.?3 
401 
For present purposes, and again stressing that I am interested in 
describing contemporary constitutional law rather than advocating its 
development in a more civil-society protective direction, there are 
two important points about the law of political party regulation. 
First, on the general methodological level, any test, like the Court's, 
involving important elements of balancing provides insecure 
protection for the objects of regulation. They can never know how a 
court will strike the balance, and thus can rarely operate free of 
concern that their activities will trigger government intervention that 
the courts will find on balance justified. Second, more specifically, 
the Supreme Court has found that states can permissibly pursue 
policies of protecting the present two-party system against erosion.?4 
As critics have observed, this allows the kind of "lock-in" of existing 
power-holders that advocates of a robust civil society fear.75 
D. Conclusion 
Taken in the aggregate, the limits contemporary constitutional 
doctrine places on government's ability to regulate civil society's 
institutions are insubstantial. The Constitution allows government to 
constitute civil society in the image it prefers, which frequently will be 
its own image. To that extent, the Constitution as currently 
interpreted does not do the work that civil-society enthusiasts 
demand. 
73. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358-59 (1997) (quoting 
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983». 
74. See id. at 367 ("[T]he States' interest permits them to enact reasonable election 
regulations that may, in practice, favor the traditional two-party system."). 
75. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should 
Not Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political Competition, 1997 
SUP. Cr. REv. 331, 343-44; Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics As Markets: 
Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REv. 643,668-69 (1998). 
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IV., "HELPING" CIVIL SOCIETY 
This Section describes the constitutional doctrine that applies 
when governments deliberately set out to support civil-society 
institutions. I distinguish between programs providing unconditional 
support and those providing support on condition that the institution 
comply with some government-specified requirements. I note at the 
outset that this Section fits awkwardly into the Article as a whole. 
After all, governments support civil-society institutions only when 
they choose to do so.76 Yet, it is hard to see how institutions that 
flourish only because government assists them can serve as robust 
sources of constraint and independent influence on government. To 
that extent, the constitutional doctrines discussed in this Section may 
be irrelevant to my larger theme. Even with that qualification, 
however, I believe it helpful to examine the law of government 
assistance, because it illustrates, once again, how little contemporary 
constitutional doctrine does to ensure that civil society's institutions 
have the capacity to act as constraints and independent influences on 
government. 
A. Assisting Substantive Activities 
In examining programs of government assistance to civil-society 
institutions, we must distinguish between assistance provided because 
an institution is part of civil society and assistance provided because 
the institution does something substantive the government regards as 
valuable (its role as an institution of civil society aside), and also 
between programs of general assistance and selective programs. 
The government's power to assist institutions in performing what 
we might call their substantive activities is both substantial and 
largely uncontroversial.77 Examples of such assistance are grants to 
faculty members at religiously affiliated universities to perform 
scientific research, or grants to such universities to construct buildings 
housing scientific research centers,18 or contracts reimbursing 
76. With the exception of cases in which the government's decision to support some 
institutions requires it to support others. See infra text accompanying notes 82-85. 
77. See Martha Minow, Choice or Commonality: Welfare and Schooling after the End of 
Welfare As We Knew It, 49 DUKE L.J. 493 (1999), for a helpful overview of the constitutional 
issues discussed in this Section: 
78. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), upheld a federal statute providing grants for 
the construction of buildings for non-religious programs at religiously affiliated colleges and 
universities. (It invalidated the program only to the extent that the program allowed buildings 
constructed with federal fmancial assistance to be converted to religious purposes after 20 
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religiously affiliated hospitals for their costs in caring for the needy. 
By strengthening civil-society institutions in their substantive 
activities, these programs do promote the indirect citizen-shaping 
functions that make such institutions instrumentally valuable. 
Grants to civil-society institutions because they are such 
institutions may be more problematic. Of course there is no doubt 
that a family-assistance program providing a direct financial award to 
each grouping defined as a family is constitutional,79 Grants to 
religious institutions are, however, more problematic. The 
Establishment Clause may stand as a barrier to a certain class of 
grants. Today the relevant doctrine is in flux, but so far the Court has 
refrained from holding that financial assistance provided directly to 
religious institutions is constitutionally permissible. The apparent 
limitations on the holding in Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of 
the University of Virginia are instructive.so The case involved student 
activity fees collected by the university and distributed to student 
organizations. Relying on a strong state policy against supporting 
religion, the university refused to make these funds available to 
support the publication of a student magazine that discussed a range 
of issues from a Christian point of view with the aim of converting 
readers to Christianity. Over four dissents, the Supreme Court found 
the university's conduct to violate the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment because it denied access to an otherwise generally 
available fund on the basis of the magazine's content. The university 
contended that the Establishment Clause undermined the free speech 
objection, but the Court disagreed. Yet in doing so Justice Anthony 
Kennedy's opinion for the Court reaffirmed a long-standing rule that 
direct monetary support to religious institutions for their religious 
activities was unconstitutionaPl The opinion also emphasized that 
the magazine itself did not even receive any money from the student 
activity fund; rather, "the disbursements from the fund go to private 
contractors for the cost of printing that which is protected under the 
Speech Clause of the First Amendment."82 
years.) 
79. Subject to the concerns, discussed in Section II above, about government's power to 
adopt restrictive definitions of family. 
80. 515 U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995). 
81. See id. at 840 ("The neutrality of the program distinguishes the student fees from a tax 
levied for the direct support of a church or group of churches. A tax of that sort, of course, 
would run contrary to Establishment Clause concerns dating from the earliest days of the 
Republic. "). 
82 Id. at 841. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who joined the majority opinion, wrote a 
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Seen in this way, Rosenberger may simply show that governments 
providing financial assistance to the expressive activities of civil-
society institutions may not deny equivalent (although perhaps 
indirect) financial assistance to the expressive activities of religious 
institutions on the ground that the expression at issue is religious. 
Suppose, however, the government provides assistance to what I have 
called the substantive activities of civil-institutions. May it exclude 
religious ones frpm the program? The central example of current 
concern is the provision of public assistance - food banks for the 
poor, counseling services, and the like-by "faith-based" institutions. 
Unlike Rosenberger, the activities being funded are not themselves 
expressive, and any exclusion would not directly limit the amount of 
publicly subsidized expression. One might plausibly argue, of course, 
that the religious institution would be excluded from the program 
because its central organizing feature was religious, that is, was a form 
of speech. One might conclude from this that the exclusion was a 
form of impermissible content-based or viewpoint-based dis-
crimination, not-again-with respect to the distribution of speech as 
in Rosenberger, but with respect to the religious institution's civic 
standing. My own view is that Rosenberger is different because it 
deals with discrimination with respect to an expressive activity.s3 But 
for present purposes I think it sufficient to note that the sharp 
disagreement among the justices in Rosenberger, and the limitations 
suggested by Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, rather strongly suggest 
that the current Court would not find it unconstitutional if a 
legislature excluded faith-based programs from their schemes of 
public assistance. 
It seems to me, therefore, that a legislature need not include 
religious institutions in general programs of assistance to the non-
expressive activities of civil-society institutions. The more pressing 
contemporary question, of course, is whether they may do so if they 
choose. The concern is that grants to religious institutions violate the 
Establishment Clause. As we have seen, the Court remains 
separate concurrence in which she insisted that the Establishment Clause often required that 
"fIne distinctions" be drawn. Id. at 848 (O'Connor, J., concurring). One such distinction was 
that "the funds are paid directly to the third-party vendor and do not pass through the 
organization's coffers." Id. at 850. 
83. A religious institution might contend that it was expressing its religious commitments 
through its substantive activities, such as aiding the poor because of a religiously-based 
preferential option for the poor, as in Catholic liberation theology. Here the analogy is to the 
limited protection civic associations get when they contend that their discriminatory 
membership practices express a political viewpoint. 
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committed to the principle that direct monetary support for the 
religious activities of religious institutions is a core violation of the 
non-establishment principle. What about monetary support for their 
non-religious activities? 
First consider indirect monetary support. May a government 
create a program giving parents vouchers that they may use to pay 
tuition for their children's education, and allow the parents to use 
those vouchers at religiously affiliated institutions? The policy 
controversy over such voucher programs is substantial, but the 
constitutional one should not be. Mueller v. Allen upheld a program 
in which the state provided an income tax deduction for expenses 
associated with school attendance.84 The deduction was available to 
all parents, but it was claimed predominantly by parents who sent 
their children to religiously affiliated schools. Although it did not use 
the term, which developed later, the Court treated the program as a 
neutral statute of general applicability, and therefore constitutionally 
permissible.85 The Court also found that the program "reduced the 
Establishment Clause objections" by "channeling whatever assistance 
it may provide to parochial schools through individual parents."86 
Subsequently, the Court upheld the use of state vocational 
rehabilitation funds to pay the tuition at a Christian college for a 
visually handicapped person who was preparing to be a minister.87 It 
also upheld the payment of public funds for the salary of a sign-
language interpreter for a deaf student attending a Roman Catholic 
high school, where the interpreter communicated the content of 
religious instruction. 
The constitutional argument against standard voucher plans 
approaches the frivolous in light of these cases. All involved indirect 
monetary support for attendance at religiously affiliated schools. 
Mueller and Zobrest involved support for instruction at the pre-
college level. Further, both Witters and Zobrest involved support for 
what the Court was clearly told was instruction in religion. Perhaps 
the only constitutional challenge to indirect monetary support 
through vouchers is the imaginable but unlikely case where the only 
instruction the student receives is in religion.88 Mueller described the 
84. 463 U.S. 388, 402 (1983). 
85. See id. at 398-99 ("[A] program ... that neutrally provides state assistance to a broad 
spectrum of citizens is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause."). 
86. Id. at 399. 
87. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,489-90 (1986). 
88. Another argument against a voucher program is that in some communities vouchers 
HeinOnline -- 75 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 406 1999-2000
406 CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 75:379 
program there as advancing the state's secular interest in developing 
"[a]n educated populace."89 Perhaps the reference is to a populace 
generally educated to civic responsibility and economic productivity, 
and perhaps an education devoted solely to religion would not 
qualify. But the class to which this problem refers must be trivially 
small, and its possible existence casts no doubt on the general 
argument supporting the constitutionality of standard voucher 
programs. 
Slightly more problematic are programs providing direct 
monetary assistance to religious institutions. The Court has 
attempted to maintain a sharp line between permissible indirect 
assistance and impermissible direct assistance. So, for example, it 
noted in Mueller that all the relevant cases invalidating assistance 
programs "have involved the direct transmission of assistance from 
the State to the schools themselves."90 The Court has never worked 
hard to justify this largely formalistic distinction, and might abandon 
it if pressed. 
B. Assisting Religious Activities 
The remaining questions, though perhaps small, are extremely 
interesting. Voucher programs and payments to faith-based 
institutions for their participation in programs of aid to the needy 
involve payments for the substantive activities of religious 
institutions, even if those substantive activities are religiously 
motivated. Suppose a legislature chose to assist those activities 
because they were religiously motivated. For example, some have 
argued that assistance to the needy is more effective in inducing 
permanent change in the recipient when it is accompanied by 
religious expression.91 Here, the ultimate reason for providing public 
support to the institution is a secular one-enhancing the economic 
position of poor people-but the proximate one is religious. There is 
will be used extensively to support a narrow class of religiously affiliated schools and will 
thereby weaken the public school system to the point where parents who would in the abstract 
prefer to send their children to public school, or to a school associated with some other religious 
group, nonetheless find themselves effectively forced to use their vouchers to send their children 
to the socially dominant religiously affiliated school. For a full discussion, see Alan E. 
Brownstein, Evaluating School Voucher Programs Through a Liberty, Equality and Free Speech 
Matrix, 31 CONN. L. REv. 871, (1999). This problem may occur in some jurisdictions, but not in 
so many as to cast general constitutional doubt on standard voucher programs. 
89. 463 U.S. at 395. 
90. Id. at 399. 
91. See Minow, supra note 77. 
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little law to go on here, but my sense is that contemporary doctrine 
allows the government to support religious institutions because they 
are religious, as long as its ultimate goal is secular and (perhaps) as 
long as it supports non-religious institutions that carry out similar but 
non-religious substantive programs.92 
Finally, what about direct monetary support for the religious 
activities of religious institutions?93 Suppose a legislature, convinced 
that religious belief is instrumentally valuable in ensuring that 
religious institutions could serve as constraints and sources of 
appropriate influence on government, chooses to pay ministers' 
salaries. At least according to the present Court, a clearer example of 
a core Establishment Clause violation could hardly be imagined. I 
assume that the Court will continue to hold this position. 
Notice then the point we have reached. Governments may 
promote the instrumental value of religious institutions as part of civil 
society indirectly, by supporting their substantive activities in various 
ways, but may not do so directly. I offer this conclusion not to 
criticize contemporary doctrine, but only to point out the 
complexities of the constitutionallaw'that constitutes civil society. 
C. Providing Selective Unconditional Assistance 
Rosenberger points to the answer to the next large issue about 
government assistance to civil-society institutions: To what extent 
must government act generally, and to what extent may it act 
selectively, in assisting such institutions? Of course in some sense the 
government never acts completely generally: if the government 
supports programs to place children in foster care, it need not support 
programs to reduce alcoholism. This is true even if some civil-society 
institutions engage in one but not the other activity. At the other end 
of the scale, we might be concerned about overly narrow definitions 
of the government's programs: May a government support anti-
alcoholism programs sponsored by general civic associations such as 
the Chamber of Commerce but not similar programs sponsored by 
92. I am cautious about the latter qualification because, by hypothesis, religious institutions 
are more effective than non-religious ones in advancing the government's secular goals, and I 
am not sure that the law would or should require the government to dilute the effectiveness of 
its investment by disbursing money to institutions that use it less effectively than others. 
93. I take it to be worth no more than a note to point out that all forms of assistance, 
monetary and nonmonetary, direct and indirect, to a religious institutions' substantive activities 
provide indirect monetary support for their religious activities by freeing funds up for those 
activities. 
HeinOnline -- 75 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 408 1999-2000
408 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:379 
veterans' organizations? 
The doctrinal answer to the "narrow-definition" question is 
simple. The government may selectively support civil-society 
institutions as long as there is a rational basis for believing that the 
institutions supported advance the government's goals more 
effectively than, or in a way different from, the ones that do not 
receive support. The Chamber of Commerce's anti-alcoholism 
program can receive selective support, for example, if there is a 
reasonable ground for believing that its program will reach a 
different, and more troubled, population of people disabled by 
alcohol than the veterans' association's program. 
Rosenberger shows, of course, that this answer is not always 
correct. It holds that an exclusion from a program supporting 
expressive activities, predicated on the content of the civil-society 
institution's expression, is generally impermissible.94 Yet a series of 
political-party cases shows that even the First Amendment's free 
speech provision sometimes does not bar selective support of civil-
society institutions dedicated to expression. Buckley v. Valeo is 
primarily known for its effects on the modern campaign finance 
regime, but it also upheld selective public funding of political 
parties.95 The statute creating the modern regime authorizes public 
support for presidential campaigns. It distinguishes among major, 
minor, and new parties. 
Major parties are those that received more than twenty-five 
percent of the votes in the preceding presidential election. Major 
parties receive a significant subsidy. To the present, only the 
Democratic and Republican parties qualify as major parties. 
Minor parties are those that received between five percent and 
twenty-five percent in the preceding election. Minor parties receive a 
subsidy in proportion to the votes they receive in the preceding 
election or in the one for which funding is provided, whichever is 
higher. The Reform Party qualifies for funding in the 2000 election. 
Minor parties that gathered fewer than five percent of the votes in the 
preceding election are reimbursed for some of their expenses only if 
they win more than five percent of the votes in the current election. 
Saying that the selective subsidies did not "unfairly or unnecessarily" 
94. I insert the qualification to take account of the fact that groups whose expression were 
extremely troublesome-satisfied some very high standard of impropriety-could be excluded. 
95. 424 U.S. 1, 85-108 (1976). 
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burden any party's "political opportunitY,"96 the Court found the 
exclusion of minor parties justified by, among other things, the 
important public interest against providing artificial incentives to 
"splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism."97 The Timmons 
case discussed earlier reinforces the conclusion that legislatures may 
selectively subsidize civil-society institutions with an eye to stabilizing 
government when more broadly disbursed subsidies might destabilize 
it.98 
D. Providing Conditional Assistance 
The programs of assistance to civil-society institutions described 
so far involve government decisions that say, in effect, "Here is some 
money to support you in your efforts to achieve some goal of which 
we approve. As long as your activities continue to be generally aimed 
to achieving that goal, the money will be available to you." These are 
programs of unconditional grants to civil-society institutions, because 
the institutions need not modify their existing activities to qualify for 
the public aid. Unconditional grants are uncommon. Far more 
frequently, the government specifies not only its general goal but also 
more particular conditions that recipients of assistance must satisfy. 
Complying with those conditions reduces the distance between the 
civil institution and the government, making it more like the 
government's partner and less like its potential adversary. I have 
argued that the government's power to structure civil society through 
selective unconditional grants is quite substantial. The possibility that 
civil-society institutions that receive government aid could serve as 
constraints or independent influences on government seems remote 
indeed if the government has power to impose significant conditions 
on grants. 
How extensive, then, is the government's power to impose 
conditions on the grants it gives? The law of unconstitutional 
conditions is notoriously complex, even incoherent. Probably the 
best view is that there really is no general law of unconstitutional 
conditions, but only particular rules about conditions that do or do 
not violate specific constitutional provisions in connection with 
96. Id. at 95-96. 
97. Id. at 96 (internal citation omitted). 
98. A decision by the Supreme Court of Ireland provides an interesting though obviously 
distinguishable contrast. In In re Bunreacht NahEireann, [1996] 1 I.L.R.M. 81 (Ir. S.C.), the 
court held it a violation of the Irish Constitution for the government to spend money in support 
of one side in a pending referendum. 
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individual government programs.99 However the problem IS 
understood, though, the government plainly has a great deal of 
discretion about which conditions it may impose. 
Here, I want to focus on a single concern, typically expressed in 
what have become minority views about the First Amendment's 
Establishment Clause. We can consider the concern in connection 
with the facts of Agostini v. Felton. l °O There, the Court upheld Title I 
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which 
provided funds for remedial education and other services for students 
attending private schools in low-income areas. New York City used 
its Title I funds to send public school teachers into religiously 
affiliated schools to teach remedial classes. The city required that 
recipient schools remove all religious symbols from the classrooms 
used for these remedial classes. Is that an unconstitutional condition, 
and why should we worry about it anyway? 
The law of unconstitutional conditions suggests that it may not 
be unconstitutional. A constitutional challenge might draw on the 
theme in unconstitutional conditions law that the government may 
not use conditions on its assistance to achieve indirectly what it could 
not achieve directly. It seems quite unlikely that New York City 
could direct religiously affiliated schools to remove religious symbols 
from their classrooms.10! A number of other themes in the cases point 
the other way, however. On one view, the doctrine is designed to 
ensure that governments act only to achieve constitutionally 
permissible goals, or at least that they act with good motives. The city 
wants the religious symbols removed so that no one could reasonably 
think that the city endorsed the school's religion.102 The classrooms 
are public classrooms, for the moment, and having religious symbols 
in a public school classroom would violate the Establishment 
Clause.lo3 Finally, the requirement that religious symbols be removed 
99. For a summary of this view, see STONE ET AL., supra note 43, at 1765 ("[T]here is no 
unitary unconstitutional conditions doctrine, but instead a set of results that depend on the 
particular constitutional provision at issue ... [and] the question involves the meaning of the 
relevant provision .... "). 
100. 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
101. Subject to the government's power to regulate a church's internal activities. See supra 
Section I1I.B. . 
102. At present, the Court holds that government actions that endorse religion violate the 
Establishment Clause. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 
U.S. 573, 621 (1989). 
103. Cf. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (holding that the Establishment Clause 
bars states from requiring that copies of the Ten Commandments be posted in every public 
school classroom). 
HeinOnline -- 75 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 411 1999-2000
2000] THE CONSTITUTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY 411 
does not seem like an act that imposes a penalty on the exercise of a 
constitutionally protected right. 
I need not determine which side of the argument is stronger. For 
now, the more important issue is: Why should the removal of the 
religious symbols be a matter of concern to someone seeking to 
understand the relation between the Constitution and civil society? 
Here, Establishment Clause history is instructive. One position, 
historically the Baptist tradition, is that interactions between 
government and religion corrupt both, but the corruption of religion 
is more important. An institution offered funds, but only if it 
complies with some conditions that might seem quite modest, might 
find itself seduced by the opportunity the offer provides. The schools 
in Agostini provided education to low-income students in part to 
express and advance their supporters' religious commitments. They 
might find removing religious symbols from a few classrooms a small 
price to pay for the opportunity to enhance the education they 
provide. But small steps taken one at a time can produce large 
changes. 
Perhaps more interesting, the recipients may modify their 
religious commitments to explain to themselves why it is all right to 
remove religious symbols from the classroom. The thought here is 
that the schools put up the symbols in the first place because they 
thought that having a visible reminder of their religious commitment 
present before every student's eyes fit comfortably with their 
understanding of their religion's demands on people. When the 
symbols are removed, they may come to think that such visible 
demonstrations are not all that important anyway. The government's 
condition, that is, may subtly induce-not coerce-changes in 
religious commitment. And,. finally, those changes may move the 
institution closer to government, reducing the constraining and 
empowering role we seek from civil society'S institutions. 
E. Conclusion 
Across a wide range of areas, then, the government may use 
civil-society institutions to promote social stability. No doubt it could 
choose otherwise without violating the Constitution, and government 
might sometimes do so. It might act deliberately, as in funding 
"outsiders" because they might bring new and unexpected views to 
bear on matters of public concern. More interesting, it might 
inadvertently support civil-society institutions that disturbed the 
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government. For example, it might provide assistance to a religiously 
affiliated provider of services to the poor, believing that doing so 
served instrumental civil-society goals, and then it might discover that 
the church's preferential option for the poor, which generated its 
interest in providing those services, induced resistance to existing 
secular authorities. The government's constitutional power to use 
civil-society institutions in ways that is in tension with the goals that 
civil society's most enthusiastic supporters endorse nonetheless 
suggests that a realistic view of what government will actually do 
should be more temperate. 
v. CONCLUSION: THE LIMITED CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF 
CIVIL SOCIETY 
The Constitution provides some guarantees for civil society's 
institutions. But the constitutional doctrines I have addressed here 
do not, taken in the aggregate, do much to ensure that those 
institutions will be able to perform successfully the functions civil 
society's most ardent defenders give it, in the face of government 
unwillingness to respect the institutions. 
Perhaps the picture I have sketched is too dark. I have not 
described structural features of the United States constitutional 
system that encourage, even if they do not mandate, the development 
of civil society's institutions. Federalism, for example, provides 
opportunities for relatively small groups of people to influence local 
governments. The coffeehouse proprietors mentioned in the 
Introduction might face zoning restrictions, but it might not be 
difficult for its patrons to get a zoning variance. Similarly, the 
separation of powers embedded in the Constitution on the national 
level and endorsed by tradition and state constitutions in the states 
provides people with many pathways they can use to influence 
government policy. Having so many opportunities, people acting in 
and through civil society's institutions might effectively influence and 
constrain the government. 
In addition, although I believe it true that contemporary 
constitutional doctrine gives civil society a relatively small protected 
domain, I have no doubt that the Supreme Court could, without 
drastically revising any specific doctrinal area, interpret the 
Constitution to provide greater protection. But the chances of such 
reinterpretations taking hold are, I believe, rather small. 
The first reason for my skepticism should be obvious. The courts 
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are themselves agencies of the state. The fact that federal judges have 
life tenure allows them to depart from the immediate political 
interests of those holding power elsewhere in the state. But the fact 
that they have been nominated by the President and confirmed by 
Senators makes it unlikely that those departures will be large, or, if 
large, sustained. 
The second reason is more interesting. It is that, despite the 
rhetoric, few people are interested in promoting civil society as such. 
Everyone acknowledges that some civil-society institutions are 
pernicious.104 Berger and Neuhaus write, for example, "[T]here are 
(to put it plainly) both good and bad mediating structures and ... 
social policy will have to make this differentiation in terms of the 
values being mediated."l05 And, from a quite different position, Jean 
Cohen "suspect[s] that only associations with internal publics 
structured by the relevant norms of discourse can develop the 
communicative competence and interactive abilities important to 
democracy. "H16 
The bad institutions' internal structures produce bad rather than 
good citizens, people who hope to use government to oppress others 
rather than to promote the public good. It is the very existence of 
such institutions that produces the impulse to regulate their internal 
activities and to deny them assistance available to other civil-society 
institutions.107 The impulse to regulate rests on grounds that everyone 
acknowledges to be formally acceptable, which means that the only 
questions open to discussion and constitutional evaluation are 
whether particular regulations are aimed at the internal 
characteristics that make institutions pernicious and are targeted 
appropriately. 
The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from this observation 
is that the concept of civil society does not work when we try to devise 
legal regulations predicated on the assertedly pernICIOUS 
characteristics. The work is done by substantive criteria such as 
equality and fair dealing. Then, however, institutions are defended 
against regulation because they are egalitarian or satisfy other 
104. The standard examples are the Ku Klux Klan and the so-called militia movement. 
105. BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 4, at 150. 
106. Cohen, supra note 1, at 21. 
107. See BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 4, at 150 ("If ... vouchers should become part of 
social policy, they should not be negotiable in schools run by ... racist fanatics .... Such 
discrimination obviously creates certain problems, but they are not insuperable."). The second 
sentence in this quotation understates the difficulty. 
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normative criteria, not because civil society's institutions should be 
defended. 
Further, there will inevitably be disagreement over whether, 
how, and which institutions to regulate. As Roberts suggests, some 
will insist that the only civil-society institutions worth protecting are 
internally democratic and reasonably egalitarian. Others will respond 
that many traditional churches have strongly hierarchical structures 
and some inegalitarian features, but must be protected anyway. 
Consider the recent controversy over New York's effort to devise a 
scheme that would allow the handicapped children of the Satmar 
Hasidim residing in the village of Kiryas Joel to attend public schools 
where they would not face psychological pressure.108 The 
constitutional analysis examined whether the state could assist· the 
Satmar Hasidim. Many who thought that the Constitution precluded 
assistance, and some who thought that it did not, were troubled by the 
character of the Satmar Hasidim, believing that the group's internal 
organization made it unlikely to advance even indirectly the valuable 
goals they attribute to civil society.HJ9 
Faced with this type of controversy, courts may invoke 
deferential standards of constitutional review. Even if they 
occasionally do not, the resulting doctrine is unlikely to provide a 
stable platform on which civil society's institutions can rest because 
the courts will surely reserve the power to uphold some regulations of 
institutions they find truly pernicious even if they invalidate 
regulations of other institutions. 
Civil society's institutions may be valuable, and constitutional 
doctrine may recognize that value. I have argued, however, that there 
are reasons rooted in the structure of the state and of the arguments 
favoring civil society to be skeptical about how extensively it will do 
so. Experience could demonstrate that my skepticism is misplaced. 
People could organize politically to transform constitutional doctrine. 
Perhaps social mobilization can use the modest protection now 
provided civil society's institutions and amplify them. Institutions 
that are actually not protected by current doctrine might still generate 
108. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690-95 (1994). 
The controversy continues. For the latest installment, see Pataki v. Grumet, 119 S.Ct. 2364 
(1999) (staying a judgment barring the state from implementing a revised statutory scheme 
designed to achieve the result precluded by Kiryas Joel). 
109. For an interesting exploration of this question, see Judith Lynn FaiIer, The Draw and 
Drawbacks of Religious Enclaves in a Constitutional Democracy: Hasidic Public Schools in 
Kiryas Joel, 72 IND. L.J. 383 (1997), and the response, Sanford Levinson, On Political Bounary 
Lines, Multiculturalism, and the Liberal State, 72 IND. L.J. 403 (1997). 
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enough power to transform the government. But these activities will 
take substantial effort, effort that those who believe civil society to be 
debilitated think unlikely to be forthcoming. Absent such efforts, the 
Constitution probably constitutes a civil society that is less vigorous 
than its advocates hope. 
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